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The very term decentralization has presented something of an enigma
to many persons who have come into contact with it, those at the top
management level who have designed the organization structure, and those
subordinates who operate within that structure. As is the rule there are
reasons for as well as answers to the enigma. This paper has been developed
to identify a sound meaning for a decentralized form of management and some
of its uses and limitations with particular reference to its application to
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Changing opinions and attitudes are often revealed in the increased
use of a word* What was once a simple descriptive term may become a watch-
word, fraught with emotion ana. value connotations. Such seems to have been
the case with decentralized management. Decentralization has come to mean
not just a movement away from centralization but improved industrial organi-
zation, efficient operations, and forward-looking management. More often
than not it nas been used to imply all-out decentralization, without differ-
entiation in its particular application to different management functions.
Goals frequently have been so broad as to make each plant completely autono-
mous, or to make each plant manager act as if he were running his own busi-
ness, even though it has also been pointed out that decentralization stated
in extreme terms is ridiculous and impracticable.
Unfortunately the term "decentralization" is interpreted in a number
of different ways, and to avoid confusion it is important to recognize the
particular sense in which the word is used. Newman states that:
... In connection with administration, centralization
(decentralization) may refer to (1) departmentalizing acti-
vities, (2) location of actual performance, or (3) the level
in the administrative hierarchy at which operating decisions
are made.
"Sfilllam H. Newman, Administrative Action (New York: Prentice-Hall,




It may "be necessary to expand the terse style of Hewman. The following
thoughts of Owens should guide us in the right direction:
Decentralization in the authority to make decisions repre-
sents a middle course between local autonomy and centralization.
It provides for central determination of "basic policies, objec-
tives, and programs and the vesting of authority in divisional
executives for planning and decision making within the scope of
the broader policies and objectives. Each divisional executive
is given much authority to formulate policies for his division
and to make decisions in carrying out company programs. Like-
wise, executives working unaer the divisional executives may
have considerable freedom in making decisions within the areas
of their authority. However, the delegation of authority all
the way down the line is not an essential feature of decentrali-
zation.
This study is primarily concerned with the real issue implied by the
concept of decentralization, that is, who is to decide what is to be done.
The organizational level at which operating decisions should be made is a
recurring problem for most administrators. Traditionally, many of the early
business writers described the average enterprise of their day as a one-man
business, run by the owner-manager. The boss, usually a member of an owning
family or the representative of a few large stockholders, set the day to day
objectives of the company within the wider policy imposed by the board of
directors
.
But today, even in closely held big companies, problems are no longer
that simple. Management ideas that were once considered axiomatic seem more
and more Inadequate to the complexities of the modern company, which makes
many different products and markets them from New York to Hong Kong, or from
Chicago to Timbukto. The history of modern corporate management is one of a
steadily increasing search for ways of avoiding the bottleneck of one-man
rule. The larger the company the more urgent is the problem of decentraliza-
tion, for an increase in size increases the number and difficulties of
Richard N. Owens, Introduction to Business Policy (Homewood, 111.:





decisions faced by top management. However, size alone is not the prime con-
sideration,for as Ernest Dale states:
... it should be noted that the need for decentralization
does not necessarily increase in proportion with size. Other fac-
tors play an important role, such as complexity of operations,
variety of products, and geographic dispersal. Onus a very large
company manufacturing a singlej simple Item might have less to
gain by decentralization than a considerably smaller company manu-
facturing diverse types of complex technical products which it
sells in diverse markets.-*
Decentralization is a subject which needs to be treated not only with
respect because it is fundamental to company planning, but xfith realism be-
cause it is of value only insofar as it is practical. The selection of a
so-.md pattern of decentralisation of authority is one of the most important
aspects of corporate planning. Jfooney states the problem in this manner:
The division of a large industrial organization, like the
division of an army, may be separated, fror. the central authority.
The manager of this division must be "on his own" to a great ex-
tent. He must have freedom of action in order to operate effi-
ciently. To a smaller degree, the salesman covering a territory
must have some freedon in order to work with the greatest effect.
At the same time, the salesman's freedom must coordinate with the
an of the division, and the freedom of the division manager
with the general plan.
The problem, therefore, is to organize so that the relative
freedom of action required by each shall be so conditioned that
all operations will coordinate effectively with the general
plans. The line and staff definitions of authority and coordina-
tion must be worked out so that at each point in the delegated
chain of line authority there is complete coordination with the
general plan of the central control and at the same time, the
freedom of action requisite for the greatest efficiency.
5
^Ernest Dale, Planning end Developing the Company Organization Struc-
ture (Hew York: American Management Association, 1952), p. 98.
k
,
James D. Ifooney, The Principles of Organization (New York and London:
Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 19^7), p. 17^-
.i
kThe Process of Delegation
Decentralization refers to the nature of a particular company's
management. It implies the delegation of responsibility and authority from
higher management to subordinates down the line. These are slippery concepts,
so it is important to consider their meaning and how they fit into delegation.
Terminology
In order to avoid confusion, it is vise to define the terms commonly
used in describing planned organizations. According to Urwick:
The first task in any such attempt is to define terms.
Four concepts are constantly recurring in discussion of
organization. They are:
Duties : which are the activities which the individual is
required to perform by virtue of his membership in the or-
ganization.
Responsibility : which is accountability for the perform-
ance of duties.
Power : which is the ability to get things done: that is to
say, it is a function of knowledge, skill and personal
qualities.
Authority : which is the right to require action of others.
It may be
(a) formal, i.e., conferred by the organisation;
(b) technical, i.e., implicit in special knowledge
or skillj or
(c) personal, i.e., conferred by seniority or
popularity.
^
In a business organization it is the formal type of authority with
which we are concerned, although of course there are degrees of the other two
types encountered in varying degrees in any organization. In discussing a
business organization, it is unnecessary to make a detailed examination of
the sources and limitations of the authority inherent in ownership. Urwick
wrote of authority:
5
L. Urwick, The Elements of Administration (ifew York: Harper and
Brothers, 19*0), P» ^TT

It is impossible to conceive of the existence of organisa-
tion at all unless some person or persons are in a position
"to require action of others." The source of that authority-
is not significant in the study of organisation.
The old concept of authority extending downward through a corporation's hier-
archy has been drastically modified in recent years by the recognition of an
upward type of authority. This is the basic authority possessed by all sub-
ordinates by virtue of their freedom to obey or disobey orders from superiors
in an organization. By his willingness to cooperate, a subordinate grants
authority w his superior; if he refuses to obey, his superiors have no
authority over him. The uncooperative subordinate can, of course, be fired,
but the firing tacitly acknowledges a failure in managerial authority. In
any case, the power of upward authority is clearly responsible for most of
management's interest in human and industrial relations. During his discus-
sion of the acceptance theory, Chester Barnard says: "There is no principle
of executive conduct better established in good organizations than that orders
7
will not be issued that cannot or will not be obeyed. "
'
Delegation
Authority almost inevitably means delegation. It is obviously impos-
sible for anyone, no matter how gifted, to give every detailed order or to
see to every accomplishment personally. This is illustrated by the often re-
peated tale of the advice given to Moses by his father-in-law, Jethro. At the
time Moses was engaged in the struggle to personally accomplish the judging
and governing of all the people, Jethro advised Moses to choose able men and
delegate to them the ordinary matters. Thus, the scriptures tell us "the hard
causes they brought unto Moses, but every small matter they judged themselves."
6
Ibid., p. k5.
'Chester I. Bariard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.:






In discussing the |>roeess of delegation Mooney states:
Delegation means the conferring of a specified authority
"by a higher authority. In its essence it involves a dual re-
sponsibility. The one to whom authority is delegated becomes
responsible to the superior for doing the job, but the superior
remains responsible for getting the job done, ©lis principle
of delegation is the center of all processes in formal organi-
sation."
When we examine the process of delegation we find three relationships
exist. In the words of Newman they are:
1. The assignment of duties by an executive to his immediate
subordinates ;
£. The granting of permission (authority) to make commitments,
use resources, and take other actions necessary to perform
the duties;
3» The creation of an obligation (responsibility) on the part
of each subordinate to the executive for the satisfactory
performance of the duties.
9
In a large organisation there is a whole series of redelegations down
to the point where the job is to be done. Stockholders delegate their rights
as owners to management. Management assumes the authority to operate the
organization and the responsibility to reply to the stockholders. This dele-
gation of authority and assumption of responsibility are carried down through
the whole organization.
Responsibility
With these three aspects of delegation of authority in mind we can now
consider the vital issue of responsibility. There is considerable difference
of opinion among writers in the field of administration as to the proper re-
lationship of authority to responsibility. The correct description of this
cardinal point is well expressed by Koontz and O'Donnell:
Q
Mooney, op. cit ., p. 17 •
^Newman, op. cit ., p. 166.
•
Despite the importance of authority, managers tend
—
perhaps
because of its connotations of power—to avoid using the word.
Thus, subordinates are spoken of as having responsibility dele-
gated to tnem, even though it is authority, rather than respon-
sibility, that is delegated. For as will be seen later, the es-
sence of responsibility is obligation, the obligation to use
authority to perform duties. Similarly, one hears of managers
being assigned responsibility, when vhat is meant is that the
manager is assigned tasks, or duties, or things to do. The
semantics of these misused terms may be clarified by noting that
managers have authority (power or the right to command) delegated
to them, responsibility exacted from them, duties (or tasks)
assigned them.
Responsibility is one of the most misunderstood terms in the
literature of management. It is common to hear and read about
"delegating responsibilities," ''holding a person responsible,"
"discharging responsibility," and "carry out a responsibility."
Responsibility is variously used to mean duty, activity, or, as
has already been noted, authority.
The Meaning of Responsibility.—Viewed internally with
respect to the" enterprise, responsibility may be defined as the
obligation of a subordinate, to whom a superior has assigned a
duty, to perform the service required. The essence of responsi-
bility is, then, obligation. It has no meaning except as it is
applied to a person. A building, a machine, or an animal cannot
be held responsible.
Responsibility thus arises from the superior-subordinate re-
lationship, from the fact that someone (in the case under discus-
sion, a manager) has the authority to require specified services
from another person . . . .^
Delegation does not transfer final responsibility. The subordinate, who has
been given a job, is responsible for performance, and the superior is respon-
sible for the results. The chain of correlated responsibilities is therefore
linked from the chief executive, who has over-all responsibility, down through
the organization.
The process of delegation and the principle of responsibility go hand
in hand. According to Urwick, "the responsibility of higher authority for the
„11
acts of subordinates is absolute.
Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of Management (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955) f pp. ko, 5^-55
•
"^Jrwick, op. cit ., p. 50.
--
8Hhe Paradox
Since responsibility still rests at the level from which the delega-
tion was made, the superior retains some control and direction of a delegated
function. THae subordinate usually feels he should inform his superior about
what he is doing and secure approval for it. Carried too far this dependence
upon a superior can nullify the effectiveness of delegation.
At the same time the superior is constantly evaluating the performance
of his subordinates. From such evaluation comes promotion, salary increases,
or censure. Inevitably, the rewards and punishments of any organization are
controlled by those of superior rank. Subordinates may bend their efforts
toward pleasing the boss and thus become yes-men. Robert Dubin highlights
the paradox of delegation in this way:
In a real sense, then, there is built into the very structure
of authority in an organization the conditions making for critical
and fault-finding relations with subordinates.
At the same time, there is built into an organization a sub-
servience to superiors arising from the structure of authority.
These two conditions of organizations often give rise to con-
siderable strain on personnel. Hie intermediate subordinate tends
to be driving with respect to his own subordinates and fawning
with respect to his superiors; the personnel in the middle levels
of administration behave in mutually contradictory ways at the
same time. 1^
12
Itobert Dubin, Human Relations in Aoiranistration, ISae Sociology of
Organization (New York: "Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951)> P» 273«
'
CHAPTER II
FACTORS DETERMINING TEE PRACTICAL RANGE
OF DECENTRALIZATION
Management's desire for more delegation of decision making is based
to a large extent on a dislike for over-centralization and a search for im-
proved structure and administration in increasingly complex industrial organi-
zations. Central decisions that fail to take into account variations in local
needs or customs have sometimes been ignored by local management. Recognition
of this and other limitations undoubtedly has been an important factor in the
recent interest in decentralization, since the move away from centralization
has been initiated from the top rather than from lower echelons seeking more
responsibility
.
There are no simple formulae to apply to the questions of decentrali-
zation. A high degree of centralization may be most effective in a small con-
cern, whereas it may result in serious ineffectiveness in a large corporation.
As Henri Fayol pointed out:
Centralization, like division of labor, is one of the laws of
nature. • . . Centralization is not a system of administration,
which is good or bad in itself, and can be adopted or discarded
at will; it is always present to some extent, so that the question
of centralization or decentralization is simply one of degree—The
problem is to find out what is the best degree of centralization
for a given undertaking. -^
^Eenri Foyol, Industrial and General Administration (New York;





Many variable factors determine the practical extent of how much decentrali-
zation of authority should he employed. The company that seeks to delegate
responsibility and authority from higher management to subordinates down the
line must be alert to these factors and their changing impact upon one
another. It is proposed to discuss only the most iiapor-tant, which are:
1. Size, number, and location of plants.
2. Nature of the company's business.
3. Economic trends.
k* Political trends.
5. The philosophy of management.
6. Personality of the chief executive.
1* Type of management function.
Size, number, and Location of Plants
Decentralization is most commonly practiced where a company's plants
and sales activities are widely scattered geographically, or where the company
has a number of different products which have dissimilar sales and manufac-
turing problems. However, where the nature of operations and work load permit
it is sometimes possible to practice decentralization on a limited scale
within a single plant or office.
The larger the size of the company, and the more numerous the de-
cisions to be made, the longer it will take to make decisions at the top
echelon where they accumulate. The managerial gap between top executive
leadership and the level of operations increases. Top management can acquire
less and less by personal direction and supervision—the information and under+
standing that are required for sound, detailed decisions covering problems on
lower levels. Decentralization reduces the size of the decision-making unit




level. Certain advantages may accrue to the company that follows this pro-
cedure. They are, in the words of Dale;
a. Executives will be nearer to the point of decision-making .
Delays of decisions, caused by the necessity of checking with head-
quarters and/or top officials, are reduced by managerial decentrali-
zation. Since people on the spot know usually more about the fac-
tors involved in the decisions than those further Kmiimil (by
physical distance and authority), and since speedy decisions may
often be essential ( competitors may move in otherwise), such a
delegation of decision-making is advantageous. It also saves the
considerable expenditure of time and money involved in communica-
tion and consultation before the decision is made. These savings
may increase as the geographical dispersion, and the volume of
company activities increases ....
b. Efficiency may be increased because there may be a better
utilization of the time and ability of executives , some of whom
may formerly have shunned responsibility as much as possible,
"going to headquarters" automatically, as soon as any problems
came up.
c. The quality of decisions is likely to Improve as their
magnitude and complexity are reduced, and as major executives con-
centrate on the iuost .'-uportant decisions. As General Eisenhower
points out "full concentration on the chief problem at hand makes
it possible to solve it; the details should be handled lower down
the line. I never fired a nan for delegating responsibility, but
I did fire men who held the reins too tight and irritated others
by their preoccupation with minutiae."
d. The amount and expense of paperwork by headquarters staff
may be considerably reduced by delegating decision-making . For
example," in" a medium-sized company the rigional managers formerly
had to check most of their major decisions with headquarters. It
took from 10 to 30 days before a decision was obtained. The trans-
fer of a clerk from one division of regional headquarters to
another required eight signatures. Kow only three are needed:—all
from the regional headquarters. As an over-all result, headquarters
staffs have been cut considerably.
e
.
The expense of coordination may be reduced because of the
greater autonomy of decision-making . This requires the establish-
ment of a clear-cut framework of general company policy within which
the subsidiary units can make their decisions. For example, at
Sears, Boebuck and Co. the establishment of such a policy has re-
sulted in a considerable reduction of the coordinating staff, with
greater freedom of action of the individual stores. Sears, Boebuck
has emphasized adaptability and ability to carry out simple pro-
cedures worked out at headquarters. In this jay risks are consider-
ably reduced. A store manager cannot go far wrong on merchandise
selection, for example, because this is done for the mo3t part by
& ;..-
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top experts at the head office. All he has to do is a good
selling job, for which he has the most incentive.
By the same token, a reduction in the size of the decision-making unit may
create certain disadvantages. They are:
1. A lack of uniformity of decisions may exist.—•It is obvious that
if decisions are being made on the lowest possible level, they are
to be made by different people who will be at different locations.
The elimination of a possible impact on one plant of decisions
made in another requires coordination and control in a firm whose
plants are decentralized. In meeting the need for coordination,
top management has relied upon various means of communication, but
has placed its greatest reliance upon informal methods with par-
ticular emphasis on personal contact and consultation with higher
authority.
2. Inadequate use of staff personnel.—Perhaps the most important
aspect of the organizational structure affecting the level of deci-
sion-making is the creation of staff experts at high levels in both
the headquarters and the plant. With decentralization, men in the
field may feel they no longer need to utilize headquarters' advice.
They may ignore advice they consider unwarranted. The headquarters
staff may be only partly utilized and its effectiveness will be
impaired. Helen Baker, associate director of Princeton's Indus-
trial Relations Section, states:
As the situation exists, the divisional industrial re-
lations managers do not always refer problems to the cor-
porate staff which they should. In some cases the corporate
staff hears only indirectly about action, which the
Ik




corporation staff considers poor industrial relations,
taken by plant or divisional industrial relations
personnel. ^5
3» Lack of trained personnel.—Decentralization may be expensive and in-
effective when a wide geographical dispersion of activities requires
remote control. Ibis is particularly true when personnel with
limited ability must operate without benefit of direct personal
supervision. Great care should be exercised in the selection,
training and development of personnel. Decentralized operations
require subordinate personnel to understand clearly and completely
the functions for which they are responsible, and their requirements.
Ihe gradual allocation of additional responsibilities and periodic
appraisals on performance are vital steps for success.
Nature of the Company's Business
3ie history of many big companies has been one of uncontrolled growth
to the point where the muscles seem to lose contact with the central nervous
system. Ihe conditions which must be taken into account to ensure the sur-
vival and prosperity of a particular organization have become increasingly
complex. Even if one is inclined to join in the modern emphasis on decen-
tralization, there still remain a number of factors peculiar to the individual
company which must be considered in planning the pattern cf decentralization.
Ihe rate of growth .—She chief executive who is faced with heavy
demands on his time is often forced to delegate many of his decisions. 2he
activities of the large company comprising everything from the efficiency of
current production and distribution to complex calculations about levels of
production, prices and wages, are clearly too vast and intricate for one man
to keep in his mind. In the process of adjusting the duties of each executive
to a reasonable workload, the degree of decentralization is of prime importance.
15Helen Baker and Robert R. France, Centralization and Decentraliza-
tion in Industrial Relations (Princeton, H.J.: inaus-cnai Ke-Lacions section
Princeton University, iW), p. kO.
-
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Geographical dispersion *—"If a company owns several plants located
in different parts of the country, decentralization nay "be both feasible and
desirable." Such dispersion of some of the plants may be required because
of the need for proximity to sources of raw materials, or proximity to labor
and customers. Living conditions for employees are often better in small
communities, -.Thereas large centralized operations tend to make huge commu-
nities with their resultant living problems.
Diversification .—A high degree of decentralization is justified
where conditions of production vary so much that important decisions must be
made at frequent intervals, as in coal mining and building. Again, if each
plant makes a different product, decentralization would be more economical.
But as Owens says:
More centralization is required if all plants make similar
products, as glass containers, shirts, shoes, or tin cans, be-
cause production schedules must be centrally controlled, and
planned production must be allocated to the different units.
Decentralization is also more easily effected in a company that
is organized on territorial lines, such as a chain of retail
stores.1?
The General Electric Company practices decentralization to a high
degree because of the nature of its products. Ralph J. Cordiner, who became
president of the company in 1950, states that:
One brave soul ventured the estimate that General Electric manu-
factures 200,000 separate products, and it is a statistical fact
that the Company lists more than 3 million catalog numbers to differ-
entiate various sizes, shapes, and rating. As far as bookkeeping is
concerned, separate operating records are kept today on about 350 lines
of products, and there are nearly 100 product-manufacturing operating
departments [on the average, each one of the departments is equivalent






•'•"Ralph J. Cordiner, Hew Frontiers For Professional Managers (New York




Accompanying the phenomenal growth of modern industry in this country
has been a rise in the living standards of all classes. In most cases large-
scale production has led to "both increased wages and lover unit costs* She
resulting increased consumer demand has required higher production quotas,
thus leading to an ever-expanding circle of supply and demand. This expan-
sion of activity tends to lead to decentralization. Dale states:
a. Expansion of business activity * The expansion of company
activities, because of the general upward movement of the business
cycle or the company's own long-term growth, tends to lead to decen-
tralization. For the rise in activity increases the number of de-
cisions with no direct effect on the decision-making capacity of top
management. Paralleling company expansion, there tends to be con-
tinuing delegation of the less important decisions.
b. Decline of competition . There is a tendency to decentralize
as the degree of competition is reduced and the company dominates
particular markets, for this is usually accompanied by an increase
in company size. Further, the increase in company security and
prosperity may make "experimentation" more feasible—and decentrali-
zation is often regarded in just that light.
The reverse tendencies may be noted in times of business
decline and as competition becomes sharper. Top executives tend to
feel that their personal influence and experience are especially
needed in such emergencies. As a result, centralized controls are
imposed to obtain cost reductions, uniform standards, improved
methods of operation, fewer mistakes, checks on expenditure and
follow-ups on execution. Staff specialist positions created to
provide staff services to local branches are often cut in times
of depression. Thus many organizations revert gradually to cen-
tralization in periods of retrenchment. Examples can be cited of
many companies that alternately centralize and decentralize with
depression and prosperity.1^
Political Trends
"Curse of Bigness."—To many persons bigness itself is unattractive
and there can be no doubt that size does create problems. In the policy of de«'
centralization, the large corporation has a means to overcome the functional
disadvantages of bigness. Thus the trend in corporate policy to avoid heavy
19^
Dale, pp. cit ., p. 115*
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concentration In one particular geographical area. Shis policy was motivated
by the fear of the political repercussions when local plants were forced to
make heavy employment cutbacks. Dale cites the General Electric Company
which "limits its employment in any one community to a certain percentage of
20
the employable population."
Another motive in escaping bigness is to avoid antitrust legislature
and labor relations problems. With the rise of organized labor and its
political contacts with governmental agencies, managements 1 problems in this
field have grown. One expansion of business concerns into units so large aa
to minimize the personal touch with the worker is another cause of friction.
In trying to solve this problem, many companies split up and move parts of
their large plants to other locations. Hodges says:
The Sylvania company decentralized production in a number of
small scattered plants, all but five of which have fewer than one
thousand employees. The smallest plant employs 230, and the
largest about 2900. She improvements reported are more flexi-
bility in operations, better employee morale and community rela-
tions, and superior executive development because of more inde-
pendence of action. In the labor field, managers of the small
plants are closer to the workers than was possible under the
former centralized operations and management. 21
Fear of war.—Fear of enemy attack is leading to plant dispersal,
largely in heavy goods production, but also in the dispersal of top manage-
ment personnel. For the most part, plant dispersal is a matter of corporate
policy. However, the possibility of destruction by bombing is a natter of
grave concern for reasons oi national defense. Owens says:
Dispersal of facilities of production affects public policy
in many ways. The problems have been greatly intensified as a
result of the development of atomic bombs and guided missiles,
^Ibid.
nenry C. Hodges, Management (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin




although some aspects of the problem go hack many years. Military
strategy has always had as one objective the destruction of the
enemy* s source of supplies or cutting the lines of communication
between the armed forces and the areas from which he drew his food,
water, and munitions. She more production was concentrated within
a limited area, the more easily was the objective achieved. • . •
. . . The atomic bomb was perfected too late in world War II
to cause serious consideration of problems of dispersal, although
the threat of enemy air raids affected much of the governmental
planning. rihe hope that an era of peace might follow the termina-
tion of hostilities and the establishment of the United nations
caused a minimum of attention to be given to dispersal. The con-
tinuing "cold war" after 19^6 and the explosion of the first
atomic bomb by the Russians in 1S&9 required that the government
review its policies on plant location. In August, 1951> President
Truman issued a statement entitled "An Industrial Dispersal Policy"
which contained recommendations concerning the location of new
plants and possible moving of existing plants. . • •
. . . According no recommended plans of dispersal, corpora-
tions would be encouraged or required to locate their new plants
in remote areas and to move existing plants away from the highly
congested industrial centers. Recommended locations would be the
smaller communities, particularly in the South, Middle West, or
Southwest. This plan, it is hoped, would provide sources of supply
to meet military and civilian needs even though some industrial
centers might be destroyed. Channels of communication would not be
overloaded. If hostilities are avoided, dispersal would have the
advantage of utilizing labor in different sections of the country,
paxtieularly if plants can be located in certain areas previously
designated as being depressed, such as communities seriously-
affected by the shift from coal to oil and gas for heating and to
diesel engines or electric motors for power. Other depressed areas
have been the towns and cities affected by shifts in shoe, textile,
and lumber inaustries. Socaal gains would 'be achieved through the
lessened loss of human life, the smaller destruction of property,
and possibly the simpler modes of living in smaller communities.
...
. . . Since the government is an important purchaser from pri-
vate industry, it can make dispersal a requirement in letting con-
tracts for the purchase of military and other supplies and equipment.
If a company would be required to build new facilities to fill re-
quirements for production, the government may refuse to give a con-
tract that would cause the contractor to build or enlarge facilities
in an area already regarded as congested.
Philosophy of Management
Apart from these very real problems, there always remains the philos-
ophy of top management which must be considered. Over the years an increas-
ing number of companies have adopted decentralization of decision-making as
^Richard D. Owens, Business Management and Public Policy (Btamewood,
HI.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 195^)> pp. 21tf-220.
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a basic method of organization. These companies include very large units
like General Motors, General Electric, and others, and medium-large companies
such as Sylvania Electric Products, and American Brake Shoe Company. The
philosophy of these financially successful companies has done much to con-
vince other executives that decentralization may assist the economic position
of their companies. Typical of this thinking is the statement of General
Bobert S. Wood, Chairman of the Board of Sears, Roebuck and Company:
We complain about government in business, we stress the
advantages of the free enterprise system, we complain about
the totalitarian state, but in our industrial organization,
in our striving for efficiency, we have created more or less
of a totalitarian organization in industry—particularly in
large industry. The problem of retaining efficiency and
discipline in these large "organizations and yet allowing our
people to express themselves, to exercise initiative and to
have some voice in the affairs cf the organization is the 2-
greatest problem for large industrial organizations to solve.
Most big company executives are now aware that high wages and bene-
fits, important as they are, do not alone stimulate cooperation. The new
concept Is to treat employees as separate, human personalities, and to
organize them into small compact teams in which they can feel creatively at
home. This is a radical departure from the "scientific management" concept
of Frederick Taylor. Such a line of thought is corroborated by the words of
John Chamberlain:
The big break from the notion that workers are machines came
when ELton Mayo discovered that the efficiency of men was bound
up not so much with mechanical simplicity of motion as with their
feeling that they were embarked on team projects in pleasant asso-
ciation with other men. Mayo showed by experiment that men worked
more effectively when they had a hand in following something
through from beginning to end.
The Mayo studies had nothing to do with divisionalization as
such. But if the smaller team was more efficient than fragmented,
23Quoted in Boris Emmet and John E. Jueck, Catalogues and Ciounters
—
A History of Sears , Roebuck and Conpany (Chicago, HI.: University of Chicago




isolated men within a given factory, it was only logical to suppose
that a "big company -would do tetter if it were split into divisions
according to region, product or customer-appeal.^
This nev philosophy of top management believes decentralization
affords a better opportunity for all-around executive development because the
small decision-making unit provides training for leadership and initiative.
Multiple Management, Beaching Out in Management and Gixmp Management all stem
from the new belief in executive development through participation.
Personality of the Chief Executive
lodges says that "the organization structure must be built around
25distinct and dissimilar activities, and not around individuals." Many
other organization authorities deny that personality should be taken into
account in establishing the structure of the enterprise. It would be a grave
error not to pay close attention to the engineering aspects of organization
and its principles. But it would be an equally grave error to imagine that
the personality of the chief executive is not a prime factor in determining
the degree of decentralization. !Ihe following comment of Alvin Brown is
worthy of note:
Organization is often more honored on paper than in practice.
On paper, where the problem of organization has been deliberately
addressed, it may have been dealt with according to principles;
yet when the document is complete it is all too likely to pass
from consciousness, leaving the daily work of administration un-
policed by its prudent requirements and limitations. It becomes
doctrine professed but ignored. . . . Toe clue to ^actual organiza-
tion must be found in the action of its members.^°
formally, the chief executive is the dominating personality in any
enterprise; therefore, the role he plays will have a definite bearing on the
2k
" John Chamberlain, "Efficient Business," Wall Street Journal, Jan-
uary 7| 1957.
25
Hodges, op. cit ., p. 122.
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pattern of decentralization. What he does and the decisions he makes depend
in part upon the kind of leader he is and the type of organization within
which he operates. Alford and Beatty classify leaders into six types:
1# Intellectual, who gains followers through his recognized
anility in specialized functional fields.
2. Institutional, who leads "because of the prestige of his
position (also referred to as "positional").
3 # Democratic, who obtains follower loyalty "by catering to
the majority desires of his group.
**"* Autocratic, who leads through domination and drive.
5. Persuasive, who engenders cooperation through a likeable
personality.
6. Creative, who inspires others with ideas, and stimulates
them io emulation.*?
Probably no leader falls exclusively into any one category. However, the
combination of persuasive and democratic leadership characteristics would
rank high in those corporations practicing decentralization.
3ype of Management Function
Finally, the degree of decentralization depends on the nature of the
management function concerned. Decentralization will not apply to all func-
tions in the same degree. Sometimes the need for speedy local decisions will
be a dominant consideration, and at other times the need for close coordina-
tion will limit the degree of decentralization possible. It is difficult to
generalize on this aspect because the nature and importance of management
functions and of their relationship to one another vary from company to
company. Unfortunately, we cannot attempt to analyze in so short a space
the degree of decentralization as it pertains to all functions of laanageiaent.
We must confine ourselves to certain key functions, as follows:
27
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Usually the production function is the first to "be decentralized and
the degree of delegation increases as the scale of production widens* Many of
the large corporations divide their operations into product divisions. Co-
ordination is maintained through the operating "budget, thi'ough controls over
production results and through the activities of a vice president in charge of
manufacturing and/or committee management. Herrymon Maurer cites the duPont
Company in this manner:
... Du Pont, therefore, began forecasting not only sales and
profits hut also working capital needs, cash requirements, and
capital expenditures. In effect, it "began determining ahead of
time what the balance sheet and the income account should be for
the year to come and for a number of subsequent years. To emphasize
the responsibility of the department and division executives, duPont
worked out a bonus system based on performance . To check perform-
ance, the top command was turned into aboard of review and other
executives into a staff of counselors. 2"
Finance
Authority in financial policies is seldom delegated below the top
echelons of a corporation. Biis seems to be the rule even where a general
policy of decentralization exists. For example, when there are geographic-
ally scattered plants, the division controller is usually under the direct
supervision of -toe corporate controller at headquarters. Ilie reasons for
centralized control of financial policies are summarized by Dale:
. . . Because the fundamental objective of almost every company
is financial, a single decision at the financial policy-making level
can spell the difference between survival and failure. For this
reason, and because top management regularly uses various types of
financial reports to check on the effectiveness of its operations,
the finance function is accorded a high place within the company,
and only rarely are any but the routine aspects of the function
decentralized. In view of the high degree of centralization of
28
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the finance function, even in companies which are otherwise
widely decentralized, the question arises as to how much lee*
way is afforded local managers in making capital expenditures,
la many companies, capital expenditure schedules are laid down in
central policy statements, specifying the sums which different
members of the management hierarchy are permitted to spend with-
out requesting special permission. Die capital expenditures vary
to sane extent in different companies, "but in general they are
limited to relatively small amounts.
Budgeting, as might be expected, is almost always centrally
controlled. The various divisions make up "budgets at regular
intervals, for review and approval by top management. Often
the detailed items of expenditure -w-Jl have to be approved in-
dividually once more "by the top officials.
Decisions regarding the raising of capital and sources of
funds as well as the payment of dividends are usually made by^
the Board of Directors or the Executive o^ Finance Committee.
Industrial Halations
Plant managers may be granted wide latitude on hiring, firing, and
recreation programs. But it should be noted that even in highly decentral-
ized companies major decisions of the industrial relations function tend to
be highly centralized. Helen Baker lists the following aims and conditions
that require centralisation of this function:
(1) To insure that industrial matters receive the attention they
should have throughout a corporation, the center of authority
must be near the top. Important decisions should be made by
executives responsible for the corporation as a whole, and
the central Industrial relations staff should be in a position
to advise top management as well as its operating divisions.
(2) Uniformity of industrial relations policies and their appli-
cation is needed to give employees a sense of being treated
fairly. When provisions of a multiplant labor contract are
involved, uniform interpretation is essential. Even when a
coapany has contracts with several unions, or none, uniformity
is desirable except for instances in which local custom may be
of controlling interest to the employees of a given plant.
(3) Aside from the question of uniformity, central clearance of
industrial relations decisions made by local managers is essential
to avoid unexpected repercussions in other plants. Decisions in
one division often have an impact on the same or even an unrelated
29
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activity in another division because of a combination of
circumstances that is visible only to someone acquainted
vith both units of operation.
(k) Sudden changes in labor relations require quick decisions by
management* Greater flexibility is insured when decisions
are made by a few officers who have frequent informal con-
tacts.
(5) Labor legislation and government intervention in labor
relations require central administration or control to
insure maintenance of legal standards and adequate legal
counsel throughout the corporation.
(6) As a matter of economy, certain special staff services
(such as legal and actuarial advice) are located only in
the head office.
(7) Plant managers and supervisors find it oore of a "mental
strain*1 to make decisions in labor and personnel relations
than in technical matters. Even when nominally responsible
for industrial relations in his unit of operations, the
plant manager or supervisor likes to be able to "clear"
with the industrial relations manager or a higher line
^
executive before making any but the laost minor decisions.
Marketing
Delegation of decision-making in sales policy is more widespread
than in any other business function. Selling must usually be done in the
field and customers are often scattered. 2nerefore, the sales approach can-
not be rigidly prescribed by corporate headquarters. 2top management may
maintain close coordination through a vice president in charge of sales who
formulates general selling policies, through a central market research depart-
ment, and by centralization of advertising at headquarters.
30
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CHAPTER III
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Explosive Growth
The larger the "business, the more diversified its operations, the more
urgent is the problem of decentralization. The difficulties begin when one
is determining how far to decentralize, how to set up the organization and
how to operate it when it is set up. In the preceding chapter we applied
various factors in order to determine how far to decentralize. Attention
will next be given to the second major difficulty—how to set up the organi-
zation.
One of the impulses that led Dig companies to look to the efficiency
of their systems of organization was their participation in World War II. To
win the war it was essential to produce the most goods in the least time
under the many pressures that existed. Without the war, the same kind of
growth would have occurred but perhaps more slowly, since large companies
were becoming larger in terms of number of plants, sales outlets, executives
and employees. Furthermore, they were diversifying the number of their
products to insure future growth. Organizational efficiency was needed to
cope with the problems caused by the rapid growth.
A great postwar reorganization occurred at the General Electric
Company, whose need for a new plan of organization is best explained by




Up until 1939* the Company was able to operate efficiently
under a highly centralized form of management. During World War
II, however, General Electric began a period of almost explosive
growth which caused its managers to question whether it might not
be necessary to evolve new techniques of organizing and managing
the Company.
From 1920 to 1939* the Company's sales volume had risen
slowly from $200 million to $3^2 million a year. By 19^3 , under
the pressure of war production, it rose suddenly to $1,370,000,000
a year—over a four-fold increase in four years. Postwar exper-
ience and forecasts indicated that this was only the beginning of
an opportunity for continuing, rapid growth in serving the nation's
demand for electrical and related products. One Company produced
over $3 billion worth of goods and services last year; and if we
do the job we should do of satisfying customers, this figure may
well rise—-as the Company has publicly stated many times—to $6
billion early in the 1960's.
It is obvious that a Company with such growth characteristics,
and operating on such a scale, requires a different managerial
approach than the Company of the 1920' s and '30* s. 'JEhis was, of
course, recognized by Gerard Swope, who served as president during
those decades when the foundations for future growth were care-
fully laid, and by Charles Wilson, the Company's president during
the hectic, war-torn '4-0's. Under their leadership, I was asked
to study the new problems of organizing and managing such a
rapidly growing enterprise.
Prom the beginning of the study, it was apparent that the
Company was going to require increasingly better planning, greater
flexibility, and faster, more informed decisions than was possible
under the highly centralized organization structure, which was
suited for earlier and different conditions. Unless we could put
the responsibility and authority for decision making closer in
each case to the scene of the problem, where complete understand-
ing and prompt action are possible, the Company would not be able
to compete with the hundreds of nimble competitors who were, as
they say, able to turn on a dime. 31
A Solution
Many people would solve the problems of management of large enter-
prises by reducing and dividing each into several small concerns which could
be more easily managed. This would be self-defeating because it would lose
to the public and to the enterprise many advantages inherent in large
companies. Mr. Cordiner states these advantages to be:
. . . the ability to ser/e as a source of major innovations
in the nation's economic life, creating new products, new in-
dustries, new employment, and new outlets for smaller businesses;
•^"Cordiner, op. cit ., pp. 1*4-46.




- the ability to energize the flov of mass production and mass
distribution; and the ability to provide a broad range of ad-
vanced technical capacity in order to produce the more complex
products and systems of our times. 32
In order to maintain the advantages of the large enterprise, General
Electric undertook decentralization not only of products, geographic location
and functions, but in addition the actual authority for making decisions. 23ae
philosophy of General Electric further envisions that decentralization embraces
the following ten elements:
1. Decentralization places authority to make decisions at points
as near as possible to where actions take place.
2. Decentralisation is likely to get best over-all results by
getting greatest and most directly applicable knowledge and most
timely understanding actually into play on the greatest number of
decisions.
3. Decentralization will work if real authority is delegated;
and not if details then have to be reported, or, worse yet, If they
have to be "checked first.
k» Decentralization requires confidence that associates in de-
centralized positions will have the capacity to make sound de-
cisions in the majority of cases; and such confidence starts at
the executive level. Unless the President and all the other
Officers have a deep personal conviction and an active desire to
decentralize full decision-making responsibility end authority,
actual decentralization will never take place. She Officers must
set an example in the art of full delegation.
>. Decentralization requires understanding that the main role of
staff or services is the rendering of assistance and advice to
line operators through a relatively few experienced people, so
that those making decisions can themselves make thesu correctly.
6. Decentralization requires realization that the natural
aggregate of many individually sound decisions will be better
for the business and for the public than centrally planned and
controlled decisions*
?• Decentralization rests on the need to have general business
objectives, organization structure, relationships, policies, and
measurements known, understood, and followed; but realizing that
definition of policies does not necessarily mean uniformity of





8* Decentralization can "be achieved only when higher executives
realize that authority genuinely delegated to lower echelons can-
not, in fact, also he retained by them. We have, today, Officers
and Managers vho still believe in decentralization down to them-
selves and no further. By paying lip-service to decentralization,
but actually reviewing detailed work and decisions and continually
"second-guessing" their associates, such Officers keep their or-
ganization in confusion and prevent the growth of self-reliant men.
9» Decentralization will work only if responsibility commensurate
with decision-making authority is truly accepted and exercised at
all levels.
10. Decentralization requires personnel policies based on measured
performance, enforced standards, rewards for good performance, and
removal for incapacity or poor performance . 33
The Organization
Under this philosophy of genuine decentralization a new organization
structure was devised. It is essentially a three-part structure which care-
fully distinguishes between the following distinct components:
Operating Management
General Managers and Managers who are responsible and accountable for
the successful conduct of their respective decentralized businesses within
the framework of the company's over-all policies and program. They carry out
over-all company objectives, policies, plans and programs and themselves
formulate and determine the goals and activities of their respective Operat-
ing Components.
Service Management
Persons skilled in specialist functions and subfunctions who are
ready and able to render expert technical service within the limits of their
respective functions on a company-wide basis, as to all product divisions and
departments. These men thus assist in the formulation of over-all objectives,
policies, plans and programs, and provide specialized functional service and







A President, who is the Chief Executive Officer, and any senior
officer vho assists him, determines the Company's over-all objectives,
leadership, planning, organizing and performance appraisals.
How Does It Work?
Operating
In the operating area various related departments are grouped into a
division headed by a general manager who considers matters common to the
separate entities. These divisions in turn are organized into groups which
are headed by executive vice-presidents.
As the philosophy has indicated, the division general managers are
chief executives of decentralized product operating "businesses. To these
men are delegated the management authority and accountability for operations
which means deciding and taking action* They have full authority to manage
their respective businesses only to the extent that such authority is speci-
fically abridged in writing, either by scope of authority limitations, or by
over-all or functional company policies.
Under this concept the product divisions have their own product
responsibility, their own markets, and their own natural autonomy, so that
headquarters can correct unsatisfactory conditions by replacing the persons
managing such a business but not by taking away their authority.
Mr. Cordiner states:
To demonstrate that the responsibility, authority, and
accountability of these Operating Departments is real, not
window-dressing, consider their pricing authority. The price
of a product can be raised ox* lowered by the managers of the
Department producing it, with only voluntary responsibility
on their part to give sensible consideration to the impact of
such price changes on other Company products. . . .
As further evidence of the freedom provided by decentrali-
zation to the Operating Department, consider the fact that the
operating budget of the General Electric Company is not a
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document prepared by the Executive Offices in New York. It is aa
addition of the budgets prepared by the Operating Department General
Managers, with the concurrence of the Division General Managers end
Group Executives. These budgets include planned sales volume, prod-
uct development plans, expenditures for plant and equipment, market
targets, turnover of investment, net earnings, projected organiza-
tion structure, and other related items.
Since they are better informed, they are authorised to make
whatever prudent commitments they should on materials, and we have
recently increased the approval authority of the Operating Depart-
ment General Managers over capital expenditures so that^they can,
by their own decision, make commitments up to $500, 000.3**-
The responsibility of the General Manager of an operating business under such
a concept of management is inevitably broad and complex. He needs to be a
thinker and to motivate others to act.
Services
In the service area, specialists in research, manufacturing, marketing,
accounting, and so on, are grouped into services divisions. It is the task of
the services division manager to plan, organize, measure and integrate the
work, people, and resources of his own functional, component, as well as co-
ordinating it as a component of the over-all organization. Corainer says,
"These services people have no authority whatsoever over the operating com-
ponents, except the authority of knowledge. Dictation is forbidden.
Services divisions provide functional services to the president and
the company as a whole, as required, and also as requested by operators at
all levels and to other service divisions. Furthermore, they have the duty to
appraise and review, in behalf of headquarters, the effectiveness, economy,
and efficiency of functional performance in their respective functional fields,
and to make constructive recommendations through channels. Within General
Electric' s organization structure the functional services officers play an






Thus, the emphasis in Service functional work Is on the
future; anticipating future opportunities and future problems,
so that when they arrive General Electric will have the personnel
and knowledge ready to meet them unsurprised. 36
Executives
The "Executive Office" of General Electric is best explained by
Mr. Cordiner when he says:
Leadership and long-range planning for the Company as a whole
constitute the Executive classification of work in the Company
structure. To understand this Executive aspect of the General
Electric organization, it is important to understand two unusual
organizational devices: The President's Office and The Executive
Office.
The President's Office is a group of Executives who share the
work of the President. In addition to the Fresident, it includes
the Chairman of the Board, and five Executive Vice Presidents.
The Chairman of the Board, in addition to the duties assigned him
directly "by the Board, represents the President in such areas as
financial affairs, public and governmental liaison, and inter-
national matters, and each of the Executive Vice Presidents repre-
sents the President in relationships with a specific group of
Operating Divisions. This unique organizational device was created
in recognition of the fact that no one man would have the time and
knowledge required to provide effective Executive leadership for
the variety of businesses in a Company as large and as diversified
as General Electric. Thus each Executive Vice President serves as
the President in a defined Operating area, without in any sense
relieving the President of the ultimate responsibility placed upon
him by the Board of Directors for the success of the enterprise
as a whole.
The Executive Vice Presidents, in General Electric, are true
Executives. That is, they have been freed of Operating responsi-
bility and administrative details so that they can devote their
time to long-range planning, appraisal of current performance,
bringing divisional objectives and plans into a working pattern
with over-all Company needs, and making sure of the needed con-
tinuity of competent managerial and other personnel in the de-
centralized businesses. 37
Essential Features
It is desirable to amplify how this philosophy hinges closely on the
concept that the "manager, ;| and especially the chief executive, must







and organizing, as distinct from operations. Mr* Cordiner visualizes manage-
ment itself as a distinct kind of work. Under his philosophy a manager is
one vho is skilled in carrying responsibility for the operating results of
others, and who has authority coextensive with that responsibility.
The manager mai&es progress through his ability to supply leadership
to others rather than by some personal technical contribution. He is essen-
tially a long-range plan;n*:r, an ©rgaaifc«r and a teacher, rather than a "doer."
The task of such a manager is replete with problems of human relations as
distinct from that of the specialist who is an expert in some technical field.
General jSieetric has solved the practical problem of building a large
organization without destroying the quality and strength of well-integrated
work units. The method followed in implementing this policy was through de-
centralization of product decisions; however, long-range planning and control
are centralized. This concept reconciles the company's need for coordinated
action with the legitimate asperations of individuals.
In discussing the concept of centralized planning and control,
I&ymond Villers has introduced the3e features:
Management must functionaiize planning and control,
centralizing it in a separate department.
Management must make a precise determination of the
lines of authority and responsibility.
Management liiust define clearly the methods by which
the various division and departaaent heads can partici-
pate in planning.
Management must develop methods of control which are
adapted to the needs of coordinated action in a decen-
tralized organization. 38
A successful plan of decentralization, therefore, necessarily involves
many and varied methods of coordinating functions to insure adequate and
smooth operations. First, the duties of everyone from top to bottom must be
well defined. Second, the respective degrees of authority must be clearly
-^Rac/inond Villers, "Control and Freedom in a Decentralized Company,"
Harvard Business Review, March-April 1954, Vol. j}2, Mo. 2, p. 90.
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distinguished, understood and folio-wed. Biird, efficient channels of contact
between personnel must be established, and fourth, the mechanics of organiza-





A particularly revealing study directed "by Helen Baker, associate
director of Princeton's Industrial Relations Section, was completed in 195^
•
This study of centralization and decentralization of industrial relations In
thirty-five companies shoved that top-management since 19^7 lias developed a
philosophical "bias toward decentralization hut that the tendency is to talk
decentralization while practicing centralization. Baker expresses the dis-
crepancy between attitudes and practice as follows:
A variety of reasons is involved in the discrepancy "between
philosophical preference and current practice. Decentralization
is sometimes seen as a goal rather than as a description of pres-
ent procedure. Even with the most sincere effort to implement
philosophy, practice inevitably lags far behind. Differences in
the definition of decentralization tend to confuse objectives.
For example, the state of person-to-person relationships, rather
than the extent to which authority for decision making is dele-
gated, may be taken as a measure of decentralization. The con-
flicting goals of decentralization and of uniformly sound indus-
trial relations in all plants make it difficult for a company to
effectuate even the most sincere belief in the value of more ex-
tensive delegation of responsibility for industrial relations
decisions. And last, decentralization is to some extent a fad,
to some extent accepted as a panacea for the problems that have
increased with an increase in the size and complexity of indus-
trial organizations. -*?
The prime reason for the discrepancy between the philosophy and prac-
tice of management is to be found in the knotty problem of delegation. In





Chapter I we concluded that while authority may he divided many ways respon-
sibility can he only partially delegated. An executive may delegate respon-
sibility for doing a Joh hut he still retains responsibility for seeing that
the joh is done. Therefore, it is apparent that no executive can afford to
delegate authority without designing a system of control to safeguard
responsibility
•
Decentralization is acceptable only if the risk entailed by failure
is not of excessive magnitude. It is essential that control he exercised at
such intervals as is necessary to prevent damage in the case of failure.
Despite all the talk and written material concerning decentralization, it
appears that in most companies the chief executive continues to make most of
the major decisions, either directly or through a formal framework of rules,
checks and halances, informal instructions, and through indoctrination of sub-
ordinate personnel to act as the "boss would act.
One ohjective of decentralization is relieving the superior executive
of the harden of decisions, other than those dealing with serious emergencies
or unusual situations. The presumption is that in the ahsence of his super-
ior the subordinate can he trusted to make a decision that will he satisfac-
tory. This entails more than the subordinate ' s intelligence, general hack-
ground, and experience in the work that is "being decentralized. It requires
some assurance that an understanding of company and divisional ohjectives,
policies, and procedures has "been thoroughly inculcated in his mind. Baker
reports the indoctrination process of one company as follows:
... the average experience at headquarters is eight or
ten years "before a man is sent out as a plant personnel manager.
In this period the central staff can he sure that the man is
fully indoctrinated with the company's policy on lahor relations
and that he is the type of person who will follow these policies.
A similar practice is followed in choosing managers and even top









Decentralization has come to be rather widely accepted as an ideal
form of organization, and in the past decade or so many companies have either
put such a form of organization into effect or have at least developed it on
paper. But the trend toward extensive decentralization is not accepted with-
out objections, and in any particular case the degree of decentralization will
vary greatly with the company concerned. Among the reasons for the resistance
to decentralization the following may be mentioned:
-*-• tradition . 03ae Ford Motor Company grew up under one-man direc-
tion and is an almost perfect example of centralization. Mr. Ford built up
the business from scratch and was familiar with its many aspects. His per-
sonal endorsement was required on all major decisions, and even for minor
ones. As is well-known, this extreme centralization almost paralyzed the
whole organization during the last years of his life.
2. Cost . Delegation of decision-making may be expensive. !3ae
degree of decentralization that is economical and effective tends to vary
directly with the availability of trained subordinates. Under decentraliza-
tion it is common to find efforts duplicated; for example, in addition to a
centralized department at headquarters, part-time or full-time departments
may be set up in the plants. She talent of personnel at either level may not
be fully utilized. Autonomous division managers may be so intent on local
profits and loss statements—by which they are judged—that they do not worry
about national markets. Moreover, there may be friction and jealousy on the
part of division managers with prima donna complexes.
3. Power . Power is the backbone of executive authority and delega-
tion seems to imply a loss of power and control. The utilization of a large
subordinate staff is likely to diffuse power, since the chief executive is
rarely able to control fully the actions of his subordinates who may
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therefore exercise a certain amount of independent rather than dependent
power.
**• Prestige . In the higher ranks the process of delegation is
compounded by such factors as competition among executives for status and
authority. Executives like to apply decentralization to their own freedom
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